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I Introduction
Implementing a strategy is not an easy task for American industrial organizations_ Many US companies survived in the past even though they did not have a clear sense of where they were going, since the resource pool seemed to be unlimited. But today resource allor.ations are much different and competition is often fierce for the scarce resources that exist. Firms today will not exist without a clear strategic direction. Regardless of company size, the planning process is the same. This process is a clear continuous process driven by market strategy that is dictated by customers and the portfolio mix of the customer (Warner, 1987) . One of the drivers of both strategy and success in the marketplace is the role of market intelligence.
I Background
All businesses have strategies, which are the methods used to make and sell products or perform services. Often, strategies are determined by a company's reaction to events beyond its control rather than by solid market intelligence and strategic planning. But the question asked is why do firms plan? The answer is simple: competitive advantage (Day, 1984) .
Several factors contribute to organizational growth in both size and complexity. Decision making gets more and more complex as the size of the business and market share increases, as does the inverse when downsizing and market share decreases. This implies a critical need for strategic focus -focusing on customer /
The research register for this journal is available at a http://www.mdJup.com/.ese •• ch_.egisters/mk1. •• pW competitive analysis. Both elements are critically dependent on rigorous marketing intelligence (Bernhardt, 1994) .
In order for companies to maximize opportunity, they must first assess their strategic position. Only then will management be able to decide where and how the company should position itself. Evaluations of past performance, marketing strengths and weaknesses, reputation for quality products, utilization issues and mission need to be addressed. All of these issues can be addressed by strategic planning and good marketing intelligence (Jaworski and Wee, 1993) .
If a company utilizes marketing intelligence systems, the output can result in sound marketing decisions which can be one of the best sources of competitive advantage. The relative importance of planning and marketing intelligence is absolutely required if a firm wants to stay in step with dynamic market conditions. Marketing intelligence provides a meaningful input by providing firms with information that allows for sound decision making (Gilad, 1991) . The goal of business is usually clear: maximize profitability and return on investment. Just as a team without a game plan is unlikely to win, a company without clearly defined strategies will not likely meet its objectives for growth and profitability (Holloway, 1986) . A driving force in meeting strategic objectives is the marketing intelligence system.
I Issues
The value of a marketing intelligence system can be substantial since decision making regarding strategy has a direct impact on the bottom line. If the intelligence system provides timely and relevant information, then the value added by the system can be measured in terms of risk aversion. Minimizing risk and maximizing profit are a natural extension of the system. A basic tenet can be drawn that MI adds value to strategic decision making and its importance has not diminished. To support this position, a survey of a cross-section of 50 consumer, industrial and service firms were surveyed in southwestern Pennsylvania. Over half the firms were industrial firms. Four key issues were evaluated in the effective deployment of a marketing intelligence system: (1) activity and value of MI in the support of customer/competitive analysis; (2) value of data sources integral to MI; (3) location of MI acconntability in the ol'ganization; (4) level and trend of MI resources.
I Findings

MI value
Regarding issue 1, MI activity and value to consumer/competitive intelligence, twothirds of the companies indicated a dramatic increase in level of activity and nearly threefifths (54 per cent) said the impact of MI contributes heavily to tactical and strategic decision making. One third said activity was level, while none indicated a reduction; 44 per cent indicated MI contributed somewhat to decision making and only 2 per cent felt MI contributed little_ Value ratings for the strategic planning functions in the areas of consumer/competitive intelligence are shown in Table L Low rated functions include guiding production and distribution adjustments (27 per cerif) and industry sales forecasting (23 per cent). The highly valued functions focus around the front end of planning, Le. target market definition, while the low rated functions cluster around the back end of planning, Le. implementation adjustments in production and distribution, and sales conversion improvement. This suggests that MI effectiveness needs to be increased in the back end planning functions (Prescott and Bhardwaj, 199.5) .
MI data sources
Regarding issue 2, value of various data sources integral to MI. value was measured by a rating scale (.5 -very important, 4 important to 1 .-not important). Table II lists each data source and reports in rank order the percentage of companies rating high, Le. at a 4 level or above.
Regarding internal data sources, the main players found on cross functional buying teams -customers, manufacturers and R&D -are universally rated at 4 or above. Following closely behind at a near 80 per cent rating is the sales force and physical product at 64 per cent The remaining sources are all near 50 per cent -ranging from 58 per cent down to 43 per cent. Seven of the nine sources scored 50 per cent or belter in high ratings.
Only five of nine external sources scored SO per cent or better in high ratings. Clients, dealers, and customers topped the list with a more than two-third high rating. Only half of market research projects garnered high ratings, while hard copy publications (periodicals and government sources) were at or below 40 per cent in high ratings.
MI accountability
Regarding venues ofMI accountability. about half (46 per cent) of the firms assign MI accountability to marketing. A quarter assign MI to sales. The remaining quarter is scattered among finance, planning, and other, Le. corporate division management. This is surprising, given MI is a subset of the marketing function and perhaps is a proxy for dissatisfaction with marketing-housed Ml on the part of corporate users (Prescott and Smith, 1989) .
Level and trend of MI resources
About three-quarters of the sample companies have MI employees; 8S per cent of these are full time. Only one third of the companies farm out their MI demands to outside consultants and in most of these cases the incidence was less than 10 contracts; 42 per cent of the companies 
Implications
Many companies recognize the critical connection between strategic planning and MI. Two-thirds of those sampled have increased MI expenditures dramatically and three-fifths said MI had a heavy impact on their tactical and strategic decision making.
Companies that realize the advantages to be gained through MI usually have a strong foothold in the market in which they operate, depending on the quality of the data and consistently updating the data. It is our belief that the trend to use MI will continue to rise and companies that fail to recognize the need for MI will lose their strategic and competitive advantage. The backward thinking firm that believes downsizing MI will increase profits through cost reduction will find just the opposite, as weak MI reduces its Visionary capability, and therefore its market leadership. Furthermore, MI's highest contributions are to the front end strategic planning functions -market targeting. estimation of market potential and forecasting product demand. Research shows that strategic success is most highly dependent on strong planning capabilities in the front end (Gilad, 1991 Competitive intelligence, as a distinct field, started out as a specialized activity nested under marketing research and known as "marlleting intelligence". In this role, the field applied specialized tools of investiga· tion (many of which were inspired by espionage) to examine the marketplace. This paper uses the term espionage in a different way than many competitive intel· ligence writers. In the jargon of the field, espionage refers to illegal techniques of gaining information; although I do not quarrel with that defmition, I use the term espionage to refer to intuitive and qualita· tive methods which result when diverse forms of information are used in a "catch as catch can" way. Members of the marketing profession have long been interested in understanding the strategies, capabilities, and options of their rivals. Gaining these insights is the essence of competitive in· telligence.
Indeed, by carefully and systematically monitoring a rival's activities, valuable clues can be gathered. If you are aware of a competitor's "test marketing" activities, for example, it may be possible to predict the rival's future products and strategies. Go to a trade show and hang around the cocktail parties; one of the legends you will hear concerns a company that discovered when and where a rival was "test marketing" new products; by secretly monitoring the c['mpe· titor's own research, it became possible for a rival to develop attractive alternatives which, thereby, succeeded in the market· place. Most of these cocktail party anecdotes, incidently, are set in the past because today's competitive intelligence practitioners have devised ways of protecting their organiza· tions from this kind of spying. In the fmal analysis, intelligence performs two separate tasks; one offensively seeks information about competitors while the other is defensive in nature and works to protect the organization's proprietary information from prying eyes.
Although competitive intelligence evolved out of marketing (with the aid of espinonage), the activities of the discipline have come to serve all business functions. "Research and development" people seek to monitor rival organizations while safeguarding their own data. Possessing information such as the production capabilities of a competitor's factories, furthermore, can provide valuable insights. The fmancial health of a competitor may influence a decision to confront the rival "head on" or (as an alternative) to strategi· cally avoid direct conflict. Although compe· titive intelligence began as a special area of marketing research, it has grown beyond its origins and today it provides information in all these areas. Parallels between competitive intelligence and marketing research, however, remain; the real trick for both marketing researchers and competitive intelligence practitioners is to appropriately envision how and why competitive intelligence has expanded be· yond its original roots and missions. A good first step in this process is to consider a brief history of the evolution of the field; this will be our point of departure.
I A thumbnail history of competitive intelligence
Certainly, some activities associated with competitive intelligence go back thousands of years; thus, Judas Iscariot was bribed into revealing Christ's location. In the past, however, the techniques of intelligence were not systemized and the people who performed this sort of work were not a distinctive group with unique methods and traditions. It was not until our era that competitive intelligence emerged as a dis· tinct discipline in its own right. (Kelley, 1968) provides a short and readable account which was easily available to management. Kelley's seminal work was quickly followed up with Richard L. Pin· kerton's influential five·article series (Pin· kerton, 1969) in Industrial Maric£ting entitled "How to develop a marketing in· telligence system". These documents can be seen as representative of the pioneering intellectual foundations of the field. Although the general paradigm employed by intelligence stemmed primarily from marketing research, some early observers noted that the field transcended its roots. William T. Kelley, himself, observed on the first page of his seminal work "Marketing research is a tool of great value to the marketing intelligence worker. However, there is a considerable difference" (Kelley, 1965, p. 1) . Having made this point, Kelley goes on to discuss the traditions of spying and !!Spionage which he notes go back thousands of years.
The next generation in the evolution of competitive intelligence, can, perhaps, best be di~cussed with reference to the work of Michael E. Porter. Porter's first book, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors (Porter, 1980) , and his later Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (Porter, 1985) were aimed at practitioners, not academics, and they drew the attention of executives to the fact that competitive intelligence was a much needed business function. Still, Porter's work primarily provided guidelines on how to process existing intelligence information in useful ways, and it tended to covertly assume that intelligence information (and/or the tools required to professionally gather it) already existed. Nonetheless, the field of competitive intelli· gence was enjoying a high profIle as a distinct business function; as a result, it was gaining a reputation as a valuable organizational activity.
In the 1980s and 1990s, practitioners (while continuing to focus on how decision makers can use business intelligence in strategic ways) have begun to concentrate more and more upon the techniques of the field. It (1985) ; it is a seminal book which helped revolutionize the field. As the years went on, Fuld has emerged as a keystone figure, not merely because of his writing but also because he is the founder of a major consulting firm dedicated to competitive intelli· gence; this organization provides training, performs consulting services that are tailored to the needs of specific clients, and the Fuld organization has a Web site which provides a wide range of information and advice. (The address of the Fuld Website is WWW.fuld.com -much useful information can be found there free of charge and it is highly recommended.) Fuld's orientation also represents the emerging generalization of the discipline of competitive intelligence in ways that transcends its roots in market· ing research. Not only are conceptualizations, such as those represented by Fuld, broader and better able to serve in a wider arena of strategic circumstances, the resulting visions of competitive intelligence have helped popularize a number of metaphors for competitive intelligence (such as those based on military analogies). While looking to links between espionage and competitive intelli· gence goes back at least to Kelley's pioneering work (1968) , it has become more refmed and focused in recent years.
Because competitive intelligence has roots in marketing research, marketers will feel at home with the field. Marketers, however, should be careful to avoid the seductive sense that competitive intelligence is little more than a superfictal refinement of their field and that (aside from a few ad hoc details) they already understand it. Here, while acknowledging similarities and borrowings, we will simultaneously center upon significant differences between marketing research and competitive intelligence. As a result, we will focus upon specific tools and orientations that make competitive intelligence unique. 
I A distinct field
As argued above, competitive intelligence started out as an extension of marketing research. As time has gone on, however, the field has developed it own traditions, methods, and universe of discourse. Here, we will concentrate upon these develop· ments and why they are important for executives, decision makers, and strategic planners.
First, although competitive intelligence evolved out of marketing research, it has developed its own methods and tools. The field has been spurred by the computer revolution, the wealth of data available via the Internet, and the need for techniques that have been specifically designed around the current situation. Other technological devel· opments (such as the availability of satellite photographs) make it possible for competi· tive intelligence professionals to study a wealth of empirical data which until recently was completely unavailable. OWing to the nature of much of these data, furthermore, special methods for analyzing them have been created. In general, these techniques (following Kelley's lead) are inspired by the methods of espionage. Another way in which competitive intelligence has become distinct from marketing research is the fact that competitive intelligence practitioners are responsible for protecting the organization's own proprietary information, not merely gathering data. Thus, the field has both offensive and defensive responsi· bilities.
While marketing research tends to be envisioned merely in terms of the marketing function, furthermore, competitive intelli· gence has come to be viewed as a more generalized discipline that simultaneously serves several business functions. As a result, the field often performs specific reo search projects on demand for vartous divi· sions within the organization. Since this is true, practitioners might actively seek to combine projects in useful and/or more efficient ways. Working for many masters, competitive intelligence practitioners may need to prioritize their assignments. It is not at all unusual for corporate intelligence professionals to publish an ongoing "organ" or newsletter to disseminate their fmdings. We can see, therefore, that corporate intelli· gence, while evolving from marketing reo search, has mutated itself into a significantly different entity and one which serves the entire organization, not merely the market· ing function.
Today's competitive intelligence profes· sionals.ofien resent being equated with spies. They, in contrast, tend to view themselves as information monitors and research practi· tioners; most of their professional life, furthermore, may be spent "online" getting electronic information or "writing up" the results. This generalization is true even though a certain amount of clandestine work may be performed. Unlike a spy movie, however, competitive intelligence work tends to be fairly routine and performed within the limits of the law. It is legal and mundane, for example, to go to a factory and note if the parking lot is full during the second shift. Although this fact could be routinely and legally checked, it may prove to be an invaluable clue regarding the health of the company (or its ability to quickly raise production). By combining this fact with other bits of information which can be legally gathered by consulting the public record (such as seeing if a building permit has been issued to the company), it may be possible to extrapolate a mosaic that reveals a competitor's future strategies, strengths, and weaknesses. The conclusions drawn from the information made available via competitive intelligence are usually not based on "hard facts"; instead, they constitute anum· ber of independent observations woven to· gether with inference and intuition. If all the data at our disposal point in the same direction. however, fairly reliable conclu· sions can result, and these intuitive judge· ments can form the basis of a forceful strategic response. It is the discipline of competitive intelligence that gathers and processes this kind of qualitative, intuitive information.
If there is an ethos of competitive intelli· gence, it is the "warfare" atmosphere. Com· petitive intelligence professionals tend to think of strategy in the same way that military leaders do and they are prone to view their organization and its rivals as competing armies. Given the impact of espionage upon competitive intelligence, it is easy to see how a military analogy has gained a hold. And, no doubt, military analogies are appropriate in numerous situations. StilI, this military focus and its influence has given competitive intelligence a specific personality, and one which may not be ideal in all situations.
The successes and unique contributions of competitive intelligence have resulted in the field being recognized as a separate disci· pline; today it exists as a formal and distinct entity within many companies. Not only that, the profession has its own literature (with 
I The qualitative Imperative
Simultaneous with the emergence of competitive intelligence, as a separate entity, is the fact that in recent years the marketing profession has actively sought to expand beyond "scientific' and quantitative methods and it has done so by embracing qualitative alternatives. As we will see, competitive intelligence has also independently embraced an array of qualitative research tools, but it has done so independently of marketing. This parallel interest in qualitative methods creates similarities between competitive intelligence and marketing research, even though the two fields have diverged in other ways. In the last 15 years, marketing research has increasingly sought to embrace qualitative models. The reason for doing so stems from the fact that quantitative methods have proved to be incapable of effectively dealing with a range of research questions. One research stream of marketing seeks to embrace the qualitative techniques of the social sciences. Especially significant in this regard is the ethnographic work of scholars such as Russell Belk, Melanie Wallendorf, and John Sherry; a few years ago, these scholars and their colleagues collaborated on a research project known as the Odyssey (Belk, 1990) , which overtly applied ethnographic methods developed in anthropology to examples of consumer research. Since then, qualitative fieldwork methods have been applied to investigating behavior such as holiday cele· brations. These scholars and their research have demonstrated the value of a range of techniques that are inspired by qualitative social sciences, such as anthropology and "face to face" sociology. While the methods of the "marketing ethnographers" were initially considered to be "off beat" by marketing researchers, today they are prestigious and state·of-the-art.
While some marketing researchers have embracfE the social sciences, others have looked to the humanities for qualitative techniques that can be applied to marketing. Sidney Levy's seminal article (1981) on the use of mythology in marketing research is an early example of this trend. In more recent years, consumer researchers have contributed to this research stream. In general, these scholars apply the techniques of literary criticism (another qualitative methodology) to marketing and consumer research. (Much of my work which has appeared in Management Decision can be roughly placed within this research tradition although it has evolved independently of it.) Combined, qualitative techniques from the social sciences and humanities have emerged within mar· keting research and they are being applied to a wide range of scholarly and practitioner problems.
In different, but somewhat parallel, ways, competitive intelligence has innovated its own qualitative toolkit and it has developed and deployed it in ways which can be usefully applied to both marketing and to other business functions. While marketing has looked to the social sciences and humanities for inspiration, however, competitive intelligence has borrowed techniques from the art of espionage. As we all know, those who make military decisions often must use incomplete, inferior, and "catch as catch can" information. Decision makers realize that the information at their disposal may be of questionable value, but these flawed data are usually all that is available. The enemy (or competitor), furthermore, may be "planting" information in order to trick its rivals. The decision maker must evaluate the available data and "factor in" the risks of both using and not using it.
Today's business leaders are seeking relevant qualitative data. This is true both in marketing research and in competitive intelligence. As we have seen, although competitive intelligence and marketing research have diverged in many ways in the Jast 30 years, both fields are increasingly focusing upon the embrace of qualitative research methods. The qualitative agendas and meth· ods of the two fields have developed sepa· rately and they have been inspired by different influences; in spite of this diversity, however, both competitive intelligence and marketing research arc united by their increased qualitative emphasis. Thus, although marketing research and competitive intelligence have diverged in many ways, they have converged in other directions. Intelligence and spying, of course, are closely intertwined with military strategy. As competitive intelligence began to gain an identity separate from marketing research, the field increasingly embraced the military metaphor. Competitors came to be depicted as military foes; the activity of intelligence was increasingly depicted using a warlike models or parallels. These characterizations are useful in two separate ways; first, much of the strategic work that executives perform actually does correspond to the efforts of military commanders. Second, and possibly more important, the military analogy is attraetive to decision makers and it is well received by them. No doubt military comparisons are useful and they will con· tinue to serve and influence corporate leaders.
I Umltations of the warfare model
All models abstract reality. That is their nature and their purpose. Models, by culling our focus down to the bare essentials, are able to rivet the thinker's attention to what is "really important".
An anthropologist who is interested in knowing how social institutions interact with one another, for example, may study a tiny tri'i~since these variables are "pared down" to their most basic essence in a small· scale society. By studying a little society, anthropologists feel that they will be able to more clearly understand how the various institutions of a culture reinforce and/or conflict with one another. Simplifying the task of investigation (by studying a minia· ture culture), the researcher gained efficiently processed information about how a larger society will probably function under analogous circumstances. Just as a model airplane might cheaply depict the behavior of a jumbo jet, the functioning of a tribe is used to predict the response of mass society.
But what if it is the very complexity (or lack of complexity) of the culture (not uni· versal aspects of organizational response) that exerts the impacts which concern us? If this is the case, studying the small·scale culture would not provide any useful infor· mation regarding how the large society will respond. In fact, if we choose to abstract reality using a model which wrongly as· sumes that today's large cultures are merely small societies writ big, we could profoundly misunderstand the situations we face; as a direct result of the model used, we could make profound strategic errors. This exam· pIe reminds us of two significant problems inherent in using any kind of model. First, once models are embraced, they tend to seductively direct our attention in their own direction. Second, a specific model may distort our vision in counterproductive ways even though we are not aware that this is happening.
By the same token, although the warfare model is useful in many contexts, it simultaneously has the ability to distort reality because it concentrates on only one set of considerations: conflicts between enemies. In addition to simplifying reality; it can degen· erate into being simplistic if it narrows our focus in counterproductive ways. The mili· tary analogy is very seductive. And it often serves as a very useful and legitimate tool since rival organizations do "fight" with one another. And, as we all know, there are winners and losers in these "battles over the marketplace". Organizational leaders, furthermore, actually do deploy strategies and tactics in ways that are suggestive of a military campaign. Many organizational lea· ders, likewise, consciously model themselves after military commanders; as a result, their behavior and their thought is largely in· spired by warlike analogies. All of these tendencies point to the usefulness of military comparisons.
[ 523] . J From another perspective, however, the military model draws attention away from the true purpose of organizations. As every marketer knows, the purpose of any organization is to serve its clients. And, of course, this truth is best expressed in the "marketing concept", which strongly aff'mns that the only reason for any organization to exist is to satisfy the client's perceived needs and wants in the most efficient and/or appropriate ways.
The marketing concept does not concen· trate upon competition between enemies; instead, it looks at the organization in terms of the degree to which it provides a sought·after good or service. This perspective, while not totally canceling out the value of a military analogy, is different and it channels our attention in different directions. Thus, according to the marketing concept (which is almost universally embraced by the marketing profession), organizations should primarily concern themselves with cooperation and collaboration between friends and allies; doing so, however, is the complete opposite of the military metaphor, which focuses upon strife and conflict between enemies.
My purpose here is not to discredit the military analogy, but simply to observe that (like the marketing concept) it is a specia· lized model which is particularly useful under certain circumstances and when deal· ing with a particular variety of relationships. And outside of the special circumstances where the military analogy serves well, it might prove to be counterproductive. The marketing concept, the raison d'etre of mar· keting, seeks to structure organizations around the happiness and welfare of its clients. We should not allow military meta· phors (even though they are useful under some circumstances) to blind us to what marketing really does and who marketers really are.
I Conclusion
Today, competitive intelligence has emerged as an increasingly independent and important business activity. Although the posture of the field is in a state of flux and although its methodolOgical toolkit has yet to be standardized, competitive intelli· gence is showing all the earmarks of emer· ging as a distinct and freestanding business function.
As discussed above, competitive intelligence evolved out of marketing research. The field, however, has increasingly evolved on its own terms. A significant benefit of today's competitive intelligJiice is that it is geared around providing and interpreting certain kinds of "qualitative" research; in doing so, it embraces techniques from military and political espionage. In this way, the field of competitive intelligence helps to "flesh out" the full array of qualitative tactics that are needed by today's strategic planners (in marketing and other business functions).
Today's marketers (while borrowing from sources that are different from those influ· encing competitive intelligence) are also becoming increasingly involved with quali· tative research methods. We are in an era when business leaders and researchers have come to recognize that gathering and pro· cessing an array of qualitative data are essential for the health of the organization. Although marketing research and competi· tive intelligence have diverged in profound ways since the 1960s, the mutual embrace of qualitative methodologies unites them once again in a number of revealing, suggestive, and intriguing ways.
Competitive intelligence is largely con· cerned with the gathering and processing of qualitative information. Owing to this fact, competitive intelligence parallels develop· ments in marketing research, even while the two fields are very different in some respects. As long as organizational leaders remember that their primary goal is cooperating with and serving friends (not competing with enemies), marketers will be able to make good use of the military analogies and the methods embraced by competitive intelli· gence. We, however, should continue to view the marketing concept as the organization's guiding light.
If organizations continue to center themselves on the marketing concept, they will not abandon their customer orientation and, thereby, benefit from competitive intelligence without losing our strategic focus. 
I Application questions
I How much has the theory on competitive strategy made an impact on organiza· tional practice in the last few years? Porter, ME. (1980) Sebuah perusahaan minuman enganalisis airlimbah yang dikeluarkan eh perusahaan pesaingnya. Tujuan :hirnya adalah untuk menghemat biaya omosi dan iklan. Semua orang-orang initerlibatdalam mia intelejen kompetitilyang misterius. ilah dunia yang dihuni oleh mata-mata ,rusahaan dan orang bisnis yang keras Iti, yang mencari peluang untuk engalahkan pesaingnya. 8ila hal tersebut dilakukan secara ,rtanggung jawab, maka kegiatan 'sebut menjadi sah dan etis, walaupun 'berapa perusahaan telah diketahui elampaui batas, seperti mencuri ormasi, menyadap telepon, merampok ntor, dengan demikian mereka telah ,masuki dunia spionase industri. Kebanyakan perusahaan tidak Isrin Zabidi, umni T/-UII dan mahasiswa ~scasarjana Teknik Industri ITS, Irabaya memasuki dunia spionase yang bertentangan dengan hukum. secara praktis hampir segala sesuatu yang mereka perlukan sudah tersedia. Para pakar mengumpulkan informasi dengan menggunakan teknologi mutakhir dan metode-metodeyang cemerlang, seperti mengambil Iota melalui satelit, meneIus uri database-database pemerinta h.
Perusahaan ini menggali inlormasi dari tempat-tempat yang tidak diduga dan mengubahnyamenjadi intelijenyang dapat membantu perusahaannya mengatasi kesulitan. Ini adalah dunia keras yang mengubah data-data mentah menjadi milyaran dolar jika dilakukan dengan baik. Jika tidak dilakukan dengan baik maka perusahaan akan mengalami kehancuran.
Tulisan ini akan mengetengahkan konsep-konsep CIP mulai dari delinisi, perkembangan, latar belakang, kegunaan, metodologilsiklus, posisi dalam strukturorganisasi dan cara membangun sistem CIP dalam perusahaan.
Oefinisi Competitive Intelligence Program (CIP) Secara umum: CIP adalah proses secara terus-menerus secara sistematis untuk mengumpulkan dan menganalisis informasi tentang kegiatan para pesaing dan kecenderungan-kecenderungan bisnis (trend politik, ekonomi, teknologi) untuk rnewujudkan tujuan perusahaan. lasan Perusahaan Tidak Memakai IP Alasan perusahaan (khususnya di nerika) tidak melakukan CIP disebabn oleh dua hal, yaitu : 1. Cara berpikir 3U sikap para manajer, 2. Cara manajer 3mperoleh informasi masih kuno.
Sikap, cara berpikir manajer
Cara berfikir manajer yang menyebabkan menolak CIP adalah :
" Tidak ada sesuatu pun yang terjadi dalam industri ini yang belum saya ketahui" Sifat kerendahan hati bukan merupakan ciri dari manajer Amerika. Ada kecenderungan dari para manajer bahwa dengan membaca Will Street Journal, koran, membaca sepintas harian dagang,jurnal, dikemudian beranggapan bahwa mereka mengetahui segala sesuatu yang sedang terjadi dalam industri.
"Tidak ada sesuatu yang terjadi di luarperusahaan ini atau di luarnegara yang patut diamat;" Sikap "segala sesuatu lebih baik di Amerika" ternyata dituangkan oleh para manajerdalam bisnis. Sehingga mereka berpikir bahwa industri negara-negara lain tidak layak. Amerika membutuhkan waktu yang cukup lama untuk menyadari keunggulan mobil Jepang, keunggulan baja dari negara lain. Namun akhirnya merekamulai belajardari industri negaranegara lain.
"CIP sarna dengan memata-matai, itu tidak etis"
Banyak para manajer yang tidak mengetahui bahwa 85-90% informasi t_ yang dibutuhkan perusahaan dapat ditemukan secara legal dan elis. Sangat disayangkan bahwa mereka menyamakan CIP dengan memata-matai industri (spionase) yang merupakan dua tujuan yang terpisah dan berbeda. Satu-satunya penyebabnya adalah pendidikan.
"CIP tidakdiajarkan di seko/ah bisnis karena tidak vital" Para manajer tidak mengetahui bahwa, sekolah-sekolah di negaranegara lain mengajarkan Intelejen Competitif. Seperti di Swedia, seseoran 9 dapat memperoleh gelar Ph.D dalam intelejen kompetitif. Di Jepang dan Prancis ada sekolah yang berafiliasi dengan pemerintah dan kursus-kursus studi yang dikhususkan untuk intelejen kompetitif.
"CIPadalahpuastbiaya, bukanpusat keuntungan. Terlalu mahal untuk melaksanakan CIP" Para CEO mengatakan bahwa CIP tidak memberikan efek langsung dan manfaa!. Pendapat ini adalah keliru, karen a CIP dapat meningkatkan mutu, perencanaan strategis bahwa CIP tidak memberikan efek langsung dan manfaa!. Pendapat ini adalah keliru, karena CIP dapatmeningkatkan mutu, perencanaan strategis yang lebih baik dan pengetahuan yang banyak tentang pasar. Namun memberikan angka pad a aspekaspek tersebut adalah suli! atau tidak mung kin bagi banyak perisliwa. Tapi dari segi lain perlu diingat bahwa berapa banyak perusahaan kehilangan uang dengan tidak melakukan sesuatu, contohnya berapa ban yak perusahaan kehilangan pasang pasar karena tidak tahu akan kegiatan pesaingnya.
Cara manajer memperoleh informasi
Kebanyakan para manajer masih menerima informasi dengan cara yang lama yang mengandalkan informasi bukan intelejen. Cara-cara tersebut adalah sebagai berikut: a. Teknik produk sampingan (byproduct) Semua laporan dan studi yang dihasilkan oleh masing-masing departemen sampai ke meja eksekutif. Metode
